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FOCUSING ON LABOR PICKETS'
RIGHTS IN SHOPPING CENTERS
WITH A SECTION 7 LENS-SCOTT HUDGENS
Picketing employees lost First Amendment freedom of expression
on private shopping center property in Hudgens v. NLRB I in 1976.
One year later, however, in Scott Hudgens and Local 315, Retail,
Wholesale, and Department Store Union, 2 the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) ruled that employees have a statutory right to
picket on private property under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).3 The Board found that the store manager violated Section 8
(a)(1) of the NLRA when he threatened to have the pickets arrested
for trespass. 4  Further, the Board noted that the pickets had a right
to engage in activities for their mutual aid and protection under Sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA. 5  Based on this, the Board concluded that in
balancing the pickets' statutory right against Hudgens' Fifth Amend-
ment property right, the former controlled. 6
This Note will compare the NLRB's interpretation of the statutory
rights of labor picketers in a privately owned mall with traditional
criteria for access to private commercial and industrial property. A
criticism will be made of the standard used by the Board in reaching
1. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Hudgens reversed Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which had established that picketing employees had a First
Amendment right to be on private shopping center property.
2. 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290.
3. The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter cited as the NLRA) has as its purpose the
maintenance of a balance of power between labor and management. This balance advances the
public interest in a sound economy. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). To achieve this purpose, the
statute created a five-member commission, the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter re-
ferred to as NLRB). The NLRB administers the provisions of the NLRA and resolves labor
disputes. It "has the power to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
4. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7." 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1970).
5. Section 7 provides in relevant part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection... (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
6. Scott Hudgens, 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290. The Fifth Amendment pro-
vides in part that no one "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
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its conclusion that pickets were entitled to statutory protection on
private mall property. Suggestions will follow for alternative standards
for the courts to use in order to reach the same conclusion if the
decision is appealed. Finally, the implications of the Board decision,
should it stand, will be examined as a new standard for the future
resolution of labor law conflicts on private property. 7
FACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
During January 1971, warehouse employees of the Butler Shoe
Company were engaged in an economic strike protesting the com-
pany's refusal to accept the union's contract proposals. The strikers
decided to picket all nine of Butler's retail outlets in the Atlanta area,
in addition to the warehouse. One of the outlets was located within
the North DeKalb Shopping Center, an enclosed mall owned and
operated by Scott Hudgens.
Four picketers carrying union placards were told by the general
manager of the mall that they would be arrested if they did not cease
picketing and leave. 8 The four left but later returned to picket an
area of the mall immediately adjacent to the Butler store. The pic-
keting was peaceful. It continued for thirty minutes before the man-
ager returned and again informed the pickets he would have them
arrested for trespassing if they did not leave. The picketers left and
Local 315 subsequently filed a charge with the NLRB. The charge
alleged that Hudgens committed an unfair labor practice by interfer-
ing with the employees' right to engage in concerted activities pro-
tected by Section 7 of the NLRA. 9
Relying on Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza
Inc., 10 the NLRB sustained the charge, finding that the First
7. Scott Hudgens, 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290. The procedural history of the
case is complicated. Therefore, to avoid confusion, the 1977 NLRB decision, which is the sub-
ject of this Note, will be referred to as either Scott Hudgens or the Hudgens Board. All refer-
ences to the 1976 Supreme Court decision will be to either Hudgens v. NLRB or to the
Hudgens Court.
8. The placards read "Butler Shoe Store Warehouse on Strike, AFL-CIO, Local 315."
Local 315, Retail and Wholesale Store Union, AFL-CIO was the union representing the
warehouse employees. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1974). The employees of
Butler's store in the North DeKalb Shopping Center were non-union. Id..n.2.
9. While Hudgens was not the employer of the employees involved in the case, it was
undisputed that he was an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(6)
and (7) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6) and (7) (1970), thereby conferring jurisdiction on the
Board. The NLRB has held that a statutory "employer" may violate Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
with respect to employees other than his own. See Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1258-59
(1952).
10. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). The Logan Valley Court held that a state court injunction issued
against the picketers violated their First Amendment rights to be on the premises. Id. at
1288
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Amendment gave the union a right to picket within the mall.11
Hudgens then petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to review
the NLRB's decision. While the appeal was pending, however, the
Supreme Court decided Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 12 and Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB. 1 3 Both cases greatly limited First Amend-
ment rights on private property opened to the public.' 4
In light of these two cases, the Fifth Circuit remanded the Scott
Hudgens case to the Board, which sent it to an administrative law
judge. 15 Both the Board and the administrative judge again con-
319-20. In so holding, the Court relied heavily on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In
Marsh, the Court held that the shopping district in a company-owned town was the functional
equivalent of a public business district for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 507-08. The term
"functional equivalent" is used to describe privately owned property that serves the same pur-
pose as a publicly owned entity.
A number of state courts reached similar conclusions on the functional equivalent argument
before the Logan Valley Court rendered its ruling. See, e.g., Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store
Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962) (if shopping center owner de-
signed property just like public business district, he lost right to ban otherwise lawful picketing
as trespass); Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal.2d 766,
394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965) (picketing cannot be
determined in terms of absolute property rights but in terms of a balance between opposing
interests of the union and the lessor of the shopping center).
11. 192 N.L.R.B. 671 (1971).
12. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
13. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
14. In Lloyd, the Court held that an owner of private property could restrict First Amend-
ment rights in two instances: when no direct relationship exists between the activity and the
property, and other reasonable alternative means of reaching the intended audience exist. 407
U.S. at 563. For a critical analysis of the Lloyd Court's reading of Logan Valley see Comment,
Labor Picketing On Private Property and the Vexation of Logan Valley: The Nixon Court Re-
sponds in Hudgens v. NLRB, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 235, 247-66 (1976); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner: The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973).
In Central Hardware, the Court held that Logan Valley could not be applied to compel First
Amendment access to a private parking lot surrounding a single, free-standing retail hardware
store. 407 U.S. at 547. Moreover, the dissent in Central Hardware even questioned the propri-
ety of applying the First Amendment to cases that could and should be decided under the
NLRA. Id. at 549. For an extensive analysis of Central Hardware, see Note, 24 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 861 (1973).
Commentators have written that the reason the Court addressed itself to constitutional issues
in these shopping center cases instead of limiting its decision to statutory questions was that the
composition of the Court changed from 1968, when Logan Valley was first decided, to 1976,
when Hudgens was decided. It was felt that the new Court, dominated by appointees of former
President Nixon, wanted to express its more restrictive view of the First Amendment than was
held by the previous Court. See Comment, Labor Picketing On Private Property and the Vexa-
tion of Logan Valley: The Nixon Court Responds in Hudgens v. NLRB, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 235
(1976).
15. The administrative law judge holds the initial hearing. He then prepares and files a
proposed report of his findings of fact and recommendations of what action should be taken.
Copies of the report are served upon all parties and filed with the Board. Either party may file
exceptions to the law judge's report within 20 days after receipt of the copy. The report and
recommendations of the law judge become the order of the Board unless timely exceptions are
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cluded that Hudgens had committed an unfair labor practice.1 6 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed1 7 and, in doing so, evaluated the other alterna-
tives available to the picketers, such as using the public streets lo-
cated five hundred feet from the mall. The court concluded that the
distance made it difficult to read the picket signs, caused traffic dan-
gers, posed difficulties in limiting the picketing effect to only Butler's
store, and diluted the impact of the message.1 8 After the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruling, Hudgens petitioned for review in the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.
In Hudgens v. NLRB, 19 the Court reversed Logan Valley and held
that no First Amendment rights existed in shopping center forums.
20
The case was remanded to the court of appeals and the NLRB for a
determination of whether the picketers were protected by the NLRA.
In remanding the case, the Court instructed the NLRB to look to
Central Hardware 21 and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.2 2 Both
cases involved the question of whether nonemployee union members
had a right of access to private property to organize employees. In
each case, the Court held that nonemployees did not have a right of
access to private property because reasonable alternatives for relaying
a pro-union message existed. In referring to these two cases on re-
mand, the Hudgens Court noted three factors that distinguished
Central Hardware and Babcock & Wilcox from Scott Hudgens.23
First, Scott Hudgens included lawful economic strike activity rather
than organizational activity. Economic strike activity embraces
employee actions designed to enforce economic demands on the
primary employer of the picketers. Organizational activity, on the
other hand, usually involves actions by both nonemployees and some-
times off-duty employees. These actions are designed to encourage
filed to the report. See generally K. McGUINESS, HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (4th ed. rev. 1976).
16. The rationale of the administrative law judge was that no other reasonable alternatives
existed for the picketers. Scott Hudgens, 205 N.L.R.B. 628, 631-32 (1973). The NLRB, in
reaching the same conclusion, held that the picketers could not be excluded from the property
for exercising their right to engage in concerted activity since they were within the scope of
Hudgens' invitation to the public. Id.
17. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. Id. For a full discussion of the treatment by the Fifth Circuit, see 44 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 130 (1975).
19. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
20. Id. at 520-21. Justice Marshall, in his Lloyd dissent, portended the Hudgens decision
four years before the Court reached it when he said, "one may .suspect from reading the opinion
of the Court that it is Logan Valley itself that the Court finds bothersome." 407 U.S. at 584.
21. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
22. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
23. 424 U.S. at 522.
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employees to form a union. Second, the Section 7 activity in Scott
Hudgens was performed by Butler's employees at the Butler
warehouse, not the retail store where the strike activity took place.
2 4
Finally, the property interests allegedly violated in the case were not
those of the employer against whom the Section 7 activity was di-
rected but of the mall owner.2 5  The NLRB held that none of the
three distinguishing factors precluded a finding based on Babcock &
Wilcox that Hudgens had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.
EXTENSION OF BABCOCK & WILCOX TO ECONOMIC STRIKE ACTIVITY
The Hudgens Board relied on Babcock & Wilcox in its ruling. In
Babcock & Wilcox, the Supreme Court denied nonemployee union
organizers access to private property because reasonable alternatives
for reaching the employees were available to them.2 6  The Court
noted, for example, that personal contact at the employees' living
quarters was "reasonable reach" and was possible because the
employees were a clearly defined group.2 7  In so holding, the Court
determined that under the NLRA nonemployees should have access
to private property only when one of the following two conditions are
met: when nonemployees can reach the employees they are seeking
to organize in no other reasonable way, or when the employer has
discriminated against nonemployees by banning them but allowing
other union organizers access to the employees.
2 8
The Babcock & Wilcox Court distinguished employees from
nonemployees, characterizing the difference between the two groups
24. This factor involves the question of whether the picketers should be considered
employees of Butler and thus be given greater access to the property than would be afforded to
nonemployees.
25. This is not to say that Hudgens was not a statutory employer under the NLRA. See note
9 and accompanying text supra.
26. 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). Under Babcock & Wilcox, a conclusive presumption de-
veloped that the nonemployee organizers had "reasonable" alternatives as long as any means
existed, however limited, for contact with employees. See, e.g., Dexter Thread Mills Inc., 199
N.L.R.B. 543 (1972) (nonemployee union organizers denied access to employer parking lot be-
cause reasonable alternative, although more expensive and less convenient, of copying employee
license numbers from nearby public highway existed); Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B.
705 (1971) (nonemployee union organizers denied access, despite danger created by distributing
literature to employees in cars on public highways and despite greater inconvenience and ex-
pense of reaching employees through newspapers and other media in a big city); Falk Corp.,
192 N.L.R.B., 716 (1971) (nonemployee organizers denied access because license numbers and
solicitation of company owned buses at bus stops on publicly owned property were available as
alternatives). See generally Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction over Concerted Tres-
passory Union Activity, 83 HARv. L. REv. 552, 552-54 (1970); Zimny, Access of Union Organiz-
ers to "Private" Property, 25 LAB. L.J. 618, 620-21 (1974).
27. 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
28. Id. at 112.
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as "one of substance" in determining whether reasonable alternatives
exist for communication with unorganized employees. 29  This distinc-
tion is valid because employees do not violate the employer's con-
stitutionally protected property rights, while nonemployees do.
Employees are entitled to be on the premises because of their work
relationship. Nonehrployees, on the other hand, are considered
strangers whose presence violates the employer's right to be free of
nonemployee interference. 30 Because of this distinction, courts have
held that employers may not interfere with their employees' Section
7 rights of self-organization unless there is a valid reason, such as
security, 31 customer interference, 32 or production and discipline. 33
Alternately, nonemployees can gain access in only a narrow range of
cases.34
29. Id. at 113.
30. See 54 B.U. L. REV. 199 (1974).
31. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973), where the
court upheld a rule prohibiting employees' distribution of union literature on company property
for security reasons.
32. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), modified 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir.
1953), where it was determined that a store could prohibit solicitation in public areas of the
store.
33. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), where the Court held
that an employer violated the NLRA by imposing a no-solicitation rule during working time
since the rule was not legitimately based on production and discipline. Working time was those
hours spent actually perfbrming assigned tasks. Working hours, on the other hand, were those
spent from the beginning to the end of the work shift. A rule prohibiting solicitation during
working hours was presumptively invalid because it potentially restricted employees' activity
during breaks, lunch hours, and other nonworking time when employees were on company
property. Id. at 803-04, n. 10, citing with approval from Matter of Peyton Packing Co., 49
N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44. See generally Note, No-Solicitation and No-Distribution Rules: Presump-
tive Validity and Discrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1049 (1964).
34. The narrow range of cases where nonemployees gain access include isolated lumber
camps and company towns. See, e.g., NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949)
(nonemployee union organizers allowed access to privately owned meeting hall in a company
town); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) (nonemployee
union organizers allowed access to solicit within isolated lumber camp); Sabine Towing and
Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423, 426 (1973) (nonemployee union organizers allowed access to
employees housed on deep sea tankers); Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1029 (1972),
enforced 83 L.R.R.M. 2992 (9th Cir. 1973) (nonemployee union organizers granted access to a
plant on small island in Alaska because of physical isolation of employees from personal contact
with union); Interlake S.S. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 308 (1969) (nonemployee union organizers al-
lowed access to ships docked in port when employees spent almost all time at sea aboard the
ship); Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1963) (nonemployee union organizers
granted access when employees lived and worked on company property and other union solici-
tation attempts had failed).
Nonemployees also have gained access in cases involving isolated resorts. See, e.g., NLRB v.
S&H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967) (court enforced NLRB order granting
nonemployee union organizers entrance to employer's hotel where most of the employees lived
and worked to solicit). But see NLRB v. Kutsher's Hotel and Country Club Inc., 427 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1970) denying enforcement of 175 N*L.R.B. 1114 (1969) (nonemployee union organizers
1292
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The Babcock & Wilcox test has become the traditional standard for
cases arising in an organizational context. The policy behind the rule
is one of protecting the Section 7 rights of employees by granting
nonemployee union organizers limited access to company property.
The test balances these Section 7 rights against the employer's prop-
erty rights "with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other." 35
Before the Scott Hudgens case arose, the Board unsuccessfully at-
tempted to extend the Babcock & Wilcox test to economic strike ac-
tivity on private property. 36 Despite the result of that attempt, the
Scott Hudgens Board again applied the Babcock & Wilcox test to
economic strike activity. 37 The Board modified the discrimination
test by saying that Hudgens, the mall owner, discriminated by open-
ing up the property to the general public while refusing to let the
employees picket. 38
denied access because union could solicit on public road crossed by most employees on their
way to work). See also NLRB v. Taamiment Inc., 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1012 (1972), denying enforcement of 180 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1970) (nonemployce union or-
ganizers denied access because union could reach employees living on the premises of a self-
contained adult summer camp by mail, posting notices at staff facilities, or by holding a union
meeting).
35. 351 U.S. at 112.
36. The Board ruled in Frank and Vincent Visceglia, 203 N.L.R.B. 265 (1973), that the
owner of an industrial park committed an unfair labor practice by threatening the pickets with
arrest for trespass. The pickets were employees of a tenant of the park. The employees were
picketing their own work place in the park. When they decided also to picket another building
leased by their employer in a remote area of the park, they were threatened with arrest. The
Board's ruling against the employer was overturned in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for
lack of substantial evidence to support the findings, NLRB v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.
1974). In addition to rejecting the Board's ruling on evidentiary grounds, the Third Circuit
refused to take a stand on whether Babcock & Wilcox could properly be extended beyond
organizational cases to economic picketing in industrial parks. Id. at 49.
37. The Board was under no obligation to use the Babcock & Wilcox test. The Supreme
Court indicated when it remanded the case that the Board should determine whether Babcock
& Wilcox was relevant to the Scott Hudgens facts. 424 U.S. at 522. Chairman Fanning, in his
concurring opinion, underlined his approval of the Hudgens Board's use of the Babcock &
Wilcox test. Fanning said the fact that Babcock & Wilcox involved organizational activity and
Scott Hudgens involved economic activity was "irrelevant." 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH)
18,290 (Fanning concurring). He asserted that since the rights of the passive employees in
Babcock & Wilcox were considered "paramount," then "even greater deference" should be af-
forded employees actively asserting their statutory rights in Scott Hudgens. Finally, he said that
the fact that the property rights interfered with in Scott Hudgens were not those of the
employer against whom the Section 7 activity was directed, as in Babcock & Wilcox, had little
significance. Id.
38. 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290 (Fanning concurring). The Board pointed out
that members of the public were welcome at the mall, whether or not they came with the
intent to buy. The Board then said that the pickets, as members of the public, "were apparently
within the scope of the invitation and welcome as long as they did not picket." Id.
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Such use of the test is unrealistic and impractical. Under this
reasoning, Hudgens could have prevented a discrimination charge
only by closing the center prior to banning the picketing. This result
is highly unlikely to occur. The emphasis in Babcock & Wilcox on the
element of discrimination detracts from the real issue in economic
strike activity, which is the conflict that exists between property
rights and labor rights.
Further, the employee/nonemployee distinction in Babcock & Wil-
cox, which is inherently appropriate for organizational activity be-
cause both groups are involved in unionizing efforts, is correspond-
ingly irrelevant in economic strike activity for reasons other than its
impracticality. 39 Economic picketing usually is carried on by striking
employees in the local union rather than outside union members who
are nonemployees. Striking employees are not strangers to the
employer as are nonemployee union organizers. The distinction be-
tween employees and nonemployees is even more irrelevant when
the employer is not the owner of the property, as was the case in
Scott Hudgens. In that case, the owner of the Butler Shoe Company
was not the owner of the mall. To Hudgens, the owner, all Butler's
employees were "strangers." This was true whether the employees
worked at the mall or the Butler warehouse. The Hudgens Board
would have been more prudent if it had rejected the Babcock & Wil-
cox test and either fashioned a new standard or relied on one that is
more applicable to economic strike activity. 40
The second part of the test espoused in Babcock & Wilcox dealt
with whether nonemployees could reach the unorganized employees
in any reasonable way other than on the employer's private property.
It is appropriate to speak in terms of alternatives to communication in
organization cases because organizers can easily identify the employee
group they want to solicit. The employer's property is the most con-
venient place to reach the unorganized employees but it rarely is the
only location. 41
39. See Comment, Labor Picketing on Private Property and the Vexation of Logan Valley:
The Nixon Court Responds in Hudgens v. NLRB, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 235, 271 (1976).
40, For a criticism of the use of Babcock & Wilcox as the standard to be used by the Board,
see Comment, The First Amendment and Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act: A
Union's Right To Picket in the Privately Owned "Public" Forum, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 466-70
(1977).
41. The NLRB and the courts have found a number of alternatives reasonable in situations
Involving nonemployee union organizers. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956)
(visit to employees' homes); Falk Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 716 (1971) (mail, and employer granting
permission for access to property); Monogram Models, Inc,, 192 N,L.R,B, 705 (1971) (tele-
phone); New Pines Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 944 (1971), enforcement denied on other grounds, 468
F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1971) (contacts at bars, taverns, and other places of recreation).
1294 [Vol. 27:1287
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In economic strike activity, however, picketing is a tool used to
communicate a different message to a different audience. The pickets'
message is designed to apply economic pressure on the struck
employers. In order to do so, employees attempt to generate sym-
pathetic support from viewers. 42  As a consequence, the effectiveness
of the picketers to a large extent depends upon their proximity to the
store. A shorter distance in time and space between when the shop-
pers learn of the pickets' message and when they approach the store
results in more effective picketing activity. Any discussion of alterna-
tives in economic strikes ignores the pickets' need for proximity to
the location. 43  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed this out in
Scott Hudgens when it noted that the strategic nature of the primary
strike makes the application of the Babcock & Wilcox alternative
means test "patently inappropriate." 44
As the Scott Hudgens Board pointed out, the right to strike enjoys
even greater protection than that afforded organizational activity. 45
For example, the 30-day limitation for organizational picketing set
forth in the NLRA is not applicable to economic picketing by a rec-
ognized union. 46  In addition, the legitimate use of picketing as part
42. Picketing plays on the sympathies of the buying public and has the ability to create
"psychic tension" in the potential patron, causing him to deny his patronage to the picketed
store. Comment, First Amendment Analysis of Peaceful Picketing, 28 MAINE L. REv. 203, 208
(1976). See generally Haggard, Picket Line Observance As a Protected Concerted Activity, 53
N.C. L. REv. 43 (1974).
43. The ineffectiveness of alternatives to picketing was succinctly noted in Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950):
Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same
information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the
very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences,
different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked
and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.
44. 501 F.2d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290. The right to strike enjoys double protection
under the NLRA. It is grounded in Section 7, which guarantees the right to self-organization,
and is reinforced by Section 13, which provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein shall be
construed so as to either interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
The courts have consistently upheld federal labor policy by equating picketing with striking
for purposes of Section 13 of the Act. See NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 281 n. 9
(1960).
46. Although Section 8(b)(7)(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(7)(c) (1970) places a 30-day limit on
continuous organizational picketing, the NLRA places no time restriction on economic picket-
ing. The Scott Hudgens Board acknowledged this distinction in a footnote. 1977-78 N.L.R.B.
Dec. (CCH) 18,290 n. 21.
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of the arsenal of strike weapons has repeatedly received protection
from Congress, the Court, and the Board. 47  Moreover, strike action
goes to the heart of the federal labor scheme. 48  It is used to imple-
ment and support the principles of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
In light of the preferential treatment for strike activity, it is clear
that the right to strike, in direct contrast to the right to organize,
requires a greater right of access to private property and, therefore,
warrants a different test than that applied to organizational activity.
To deny access to striking workers would drastically weaken the na-
tional scheme of labor relations. Requiring striking pickets to resort to
television, radio, and newspaper advertisements would limit the abil-
ity of employees to put pressure on their employers and would seri-
ously disadvantage the smaller and poorer labor unions. As a con-
sequence, striking employees would be denied the protection Con-
gress traditionally and consistently has afforded them.
The Hudgens Board gave proper weight to both Board and Court
precedent as well as to cost to the union when it ruled in favor of
granting the picketers access to the private property. 49 In so ruling,
however; the Board should not have relied on a standard formulated
for organizational cases. A more appropriate standard should focus on
the particular factors involved in economic strike cases and should be
consistent with Court and Congressional protection of the right to
strike.
47. Congress has redirected national labor policy through various changes in the Taft-
Hartley Act, but its concern for the strong continuation of the strike weapon has remained
constant. For example, as the Court pointed out in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221,
234-35 (1963):
[W]hen Congress chose to qualify the use of the strike, it did so by prescribing the
limits and conditions of the abridgement in exacting detail... and by preserving
the positive command of Section 13 that the right to strike is to be given a generous
interpretation within the scope of the labor Act.
Court support of the strike weapon has been consistent. The Court recognized Congress' intent
to preserve not only the right to strike but also the right to picket as a "major weapon to
implement the goals of a strike" in United Steel Workers of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492,
499 (1964). See also NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 670 (1951) (agents of
union who picketed unorganized mill and encouraged truckers of a neutral employer to refrain
from going to the mill did not violate the NLRA's prohibition against secondary boycotts); In-
ternational Union of United Automobile Workers of America v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950)
(strike vote provisions of Michigan labor mediation law conflicted with NLRA).
The Board said in Frank & Vincent Visceglia, 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 267 (1973), that the NLRA
gave employees the right to picket their own employer at a primary location.
48. See Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963). See also Straus, Alternatives to
the Strike, 23 LAB. L.J. 387 (1972).
49. 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) $ 18,290.
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PROPOSED STANDARD FOR PICKE TING ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
Because of the history of Congressional support for peaceful pic-
keting, the Board should have fashioned a standard in Scott Hudgens
that would have given picketers a presumptive right of access to pri-
vate property.50 This presumptive right would be granted to all
employees engaged in peaceful picketing protected by Section 7. An
employer or mall owner could rebut this presumption by meeting the
same standards now set for overriding employees' Section 7 organiza-
tional rights: a showing that the activity endangered customers, im-
peded security, or dangerously interfered with the essential operation
of the property. 5' By focusing on a balance between property and
picketing rights, the presumption would be that employees have ac-
cess to the property. At the same time, the proposed standard would
serve a dual purpose: protecting peaceful picketing by ensuring that
laborers in private malls be subject to the same NLRA protections as
those employed in municipally owned business districts and giving
employers a reasonable means of stopping any picketing that could
prove dangerous to the public or the property involved.52
Since the Board apparently was reluctant to fashion a new stan-
dard, it should have chosen a more appropriate existing standard. For
example, the Board could have relied on case precedent governing
common situs situations. Common situs situations are those which in-
volve more than one employer occupying the same physical loca-
50. See Comment, The First Amendment and Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act:
A Union's Right to Picket in the Privately Owned "Public" Forum, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 437, 468
(1977).
51. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
52. Ownership of private property has never been free from government restriction. How-
ever, the degree of regulation over property has changed over the years. For a comparison of
this ever-changing concept of the nature of property, compare 1 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMEN-
TARIES 139.
So great is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize
the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole commun-
ity .... In vain may it be urged that the good of the individual ought to yield to
that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even
any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it
be expedient or no.
with B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 87-88 (1921):
Property, like liberty, though immune under the Constitution from destruction,
is not immune from regulation essential for the common good. What the regulation
shall be, every generation must work out for itself.... Enough for my purpose at




tion. 53 Scott Hudgens was a clear common situs situation. Hudgens
was a neutral mall owner whose property interests were affected be-
cause of a dispute that arose between one of his employer/tenants and
the tenant's union. Equally neutral were the other employers leasing
in the mall. Accordingly, the Board in Scott Hudgens should have
applied the standard it fashioned for itself in Sailors' Union (Moore
Dry Dock Co.) for guidance in such situations. 54  In Moore Dry
Dock, the Board made it clear that primary picketing at a situs owned
by a secondary employer could be allowed only if four conditions
were met. The picketing must be limited to times during which the
employer was actually at the site. The primary employer must be
engaged in his ordinary course of business at the site. The picketing
must be reasonably close to the actual location of the primary
employer. Finally, any picketing signs used must clearly state that
the dispute was only with the primary employer. 55 The courts have
interpreted common situs guidelines to mean that a union must exer-
cise its right to picket in common situs situations with restraint con-
sistent with the right of neutral employers to remain uninvolved in
the dispute. 56 Applying the Moore Dry Dock guidelines in Scott
Hudgens, Local 315 would have been allowed to picket Butler in the
mall while Butler was open for business. The pickets would carry
signs that clearly disclosed that the dispute was with Butler and none
of the other fifty-nine stores in the mall. The pickets would be as
close to Butler as was reasonably possible. These guidelines fit the
Hudgens facts comfortably without the strain that accompanies the
application of the Babcock & Wilcox test to the same facts.
53. Common situs situations present the problem of determining whether a union is en-
gaged in illegal action against an employer who is uninvolved in the labor dispute and therefore
neutral. The problem is that any primary strike activity directed toward one employer at the
site can very well affect all. The NLRA protects primary picketing, which is the term used
when the union's object is to put pressure directly on the person who employs the union
members. If the union's object is primary, any secondary effects do not make the picketing
illegal under Section 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), which is the secondary boycott provi-
sion of the NLRA. See generally Duerr, Developing a Standard for Secondary Consumer Pick-
eting, 26 LAB. L.J. 585 (1975).
54. 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). Moore Dry Dock Co. is a case in which crewmen of a ship
picketed at the entrance gate to the Moore shipyard. Moore was the neutral employer.
55. Id. at 549.
56. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (NLRA
protected economic picketing of a secondary employer when picketers narrowly confined the
message to the product of the primary employer); Retail Fruit and Vegetable Clerks Local 1017,
116 N.L.R.B. 856, enforced 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957) (the secondary boycott ban does not,
per se, bar common situs picketing; however, such picketing must be performed with restraint
that preserves the right of a neutral employer to remain uninvolved).
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUDGENS BOARD DECISION
The most obvious effect of the Board decision in applying the Bab-
cock & Wilcox test as the standard for economic strike activity on
private mall property is that the balance virtually is certain to be
weighted in favor of the employees. In contrast, organizational activ-
ity usually involved the balance being struck in favor of the employer
because it was felt that organizers usually could reach the unor-
ganized employees through other means.5 7 However, because the
nature of picketing requires that workers be close to the employer's
location during the strike and because picketing traditionally has been
regarded with such profound respect by Congress and the judiciary,
it would be unreasonable to predict anything but an almost guaran-
teed right of access for employees. 58
Thus, the Scott Hudgens decision caused a clear erosion of
employer property rights and a corresponding reinforcement and
strengthening of employee picketing rights. Employees can now
picket in front of a store in a privately owned mall with the same
impunity they would enjoy if the store were in a municipal district.
They can picket the store in the mall even if the labor dispute with
the employer arose at a location outside of the mall. 59
This result seems clearly reasonable and consistent with labor law
precedent. Any other interpretation would result in the anomolous
situation of downtown retailers being required to allow picketing
while exempting retailers in private malls. Merchants in malls should
be subject to the same legislation on labor issues that now governs
their colleagues in public business districts. To immunize merchants
in malls from picketers might create a situation in which employers
could evade the law by seeking mall locations. 60
57. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 42, 43, 47 and accompanying text supra.
59. 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290. The labor dispute originally arose at the Butler
warehouse. Thereaier, the warehouse employees picketed Butler's retail outlet in the mall.
60. The Scott Hudgens Board's holding specifically was designed to prohibit employers from
insulating themselves from Section 7 activities by relocating to leased locations in private malls.
1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec (CCH) 18,290. If the current business trend of moving to shopping
centers continues, as it is expected to, hundreds of thousands of employees would go without
benefit of picketing rights if the, Board had held that property rights should outweigh labor
rights. In Logan Valley, a 1968 decision, the Court took note that by the end of 1966 there
were between 10,000 and 11,000 shopping centers in the United States and Canada. This ac-
counted for approximately 37 per cent of the total retail sales in those two countries. 391 U.S.
308, 324 (1968). The trend has not yet abated. See Note, Shopping Center Picketing: The Im-




Property owners probably can do little, if anything, to alter the
effect of this decision on them. If mall owners establish no-solicitation
and no-distribution rules and then uniformly enforce them, they
probably will avoid charges of discriminatory treatment from unions.
What remains unavoidable, however, is the fact that precedent virtu-
ally dictates that picketers be granted access to property because no
other alternative to communicating their message could be considered
reasonable. Thus, property owners not only will be obliged to grant
access to picketers but also they probably will be unable to institute
any rule limiting picketing to certain areas of the mall because the
Hudgens Board specifically affirmed the right of the employees to
picket in front of the mall. 61
Geraldine R. Fehst
61. 1977-78 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) 18,290. Although the Scott Hudgens decision resolved
the question of whether laborers have a right of access to private property to picket their
employer, it left unanswered one very important question: to what extent may the state be
called in to enforce trespass laws against picketers? That question is expected to be resolved by
the Court this term in Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 132
Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 905 (1977) (No. 76-750). See Jay, Shopping Cen-
ters As Battlegrounds Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 189,
201-02 (1976), for the view that the central legal issue in economic picketing in shopping centers
is the extent to which states can enter the dispute.
1300 [Vol. 27:1287
